

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 001379

61

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY AF"EWMULCAHY

APPROVED BY AF:EWMULCAHY

S/S :RKUCHEL

S:JCOVEY

----- 095562

O P 030200Z JAN 76 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 001379

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AO, UG

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS: MESSAGE TO IDI AMIN

1. USING IDENTICAL TEXT OF MESSAGE (SENT SEPTTEL) FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO PRESIDENT KENYATTA, EMBASSY SHOULD PREPARE A MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT IDI AMIN DADA OF UGANDA. MESSAGE SHOULD BE DELIVERED SOONEST TO IDI AMIN OR APPROPRIATE SENIOR UGANDAN OFFICIAL IN PERSON IN KAMPALA BY SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICIAL, DCM LINDSTROM PREFERABLY.
2. EMBOFF SHOULD ALSO PREPARE FOR DELIVERY AT SAME TIME AIDE-MEMOIRE USING TALKING POINTS PREPARED FOR USE BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE IN CURRENT VISITS WITH CENTRAL AND WEST AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE, AS FOLLOWS:

TALKING POINTS FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE'S TALKS
WITH AFRICAN LEADERS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 001379

1. MY GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED ME TO UNDERTAKE THIS TRIP
FOR THREE PRINCIPAL REASONS: (A) TO DISCUSS WITH YOU

THE STAKES WE BELIEVE ARE INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT SOVIET-
CUBAN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A FOOTHOLD IN ANGOLA:
(B) TO ASSURE YOU OF OUR DETERMINATION TO REMAIN INVOLVED
SO THAT THE ANGOLANS CAN DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE
WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE; AND (C) TO EXPLORE HOW
THE OAU CAN HELP BRING ABOUT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
SATISFACTORY TO ALL ANGOLANS AND AFRICA GENERALLY WHICH
WOULD ALSO END ALL OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, INCLUDING
SOVIET, CUBAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN.

2. THE U.S. SEEKS NO SPECIAL INTERESTS OR PLACE IN
ANGOLA. WE HAVE NO VITAL STAKE THERE; ALL THAT WE WANT
IS FAIR ACCESS ALONG WITH ALL OTHERS. WE ARE NOT
SEEKING A FNLA/UNITA VICTORY OVER THE MPLA. WE ARE NOT
AGAINST THE MPLA PER SE. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE THREE
FACTIONS RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY WITH
THE HELP OF THE OAU.

3. IN ADDITION THE U.S. AS A GLOBAL POWER HAS ITS
OWN RESPONSIBILITIES. WE CANNOT VIEW WITH INDIFFERENCE
A SOVIET POWER PLAY, SUPPORTED BY CUBAN TROOPS,
8,000 MILES FROM ITS OWN BORDERS WELL OUTSIDE ITS
TRADITIONAL AREA OF SECURITY INTEREST.

4. FUNDAMENTAL TO SUCH A SOLUTION IS THAT THE SITUATION
ON THE GROUND IS SUCH AS TO HELP PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS
UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE OAU.

5. WHAT IS AT STAKE IS WHETHER A MASSIVE SOVIET
INVOLVEMENT CAN BE ALLOWED TO IMPOSE A COMMUNIST-ORIENTED
LEADERSHIP ON ALL OF THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE. IF THE U.S.
WERE TO LEAVE THIS MATTER UNCHALLENGED, OUR JUDGMENT
IS THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE WOULD INCREASE IN AFRICA
CONTRARY TO THE NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE BLACK
AFRICAN STATES AND WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE
CONTINENT OF AFRICA. WE KNOW THAT SOUTH AFRICAN
POLICY -- WHICH MOST AFRICANS UNDERSTAND FIRST-HAND
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 001379

FROM DAILY EXPERIENCE -- SEEMS TO SOME AFRICANS EVEN
MORE INIMICAL TO AFRICAN STATES THAN THE MASSIVE SOVIET
IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION. WE RESPECT AND APPRECIATE
THE STRONG FORCE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM, BUT AFRICANS
SHOULD REALIZE THAT SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, IF ALLOWED
TO SUCCEED, WILL NOT BE EASILY REMOVED DESPITE THE FORCE
OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO USE OUR
INFLUENCE TO END SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT WITHIN

THE CONTEXT OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN INTERVENTION.
WE ARE CONFIDENT WE CAN SUCCEED IN THIS.

6. THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE SENATE WAS REGRETTABLE.
BUT THE HOUSE HAS NOT ACTED AND THE CONGRESS WILL NOT
RETURN UNTIL THE LATTER HALF OF JANUARY. IN THE
MEANTIME, WE HAVE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES AND WILL
CONTINUE TO ASSIST TO ASSURE THAT SOVIET-CUBAN ARMS
WILL NOT RESULT IN AN MPLA VICTORY ON THE GROUND.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS AFRICAN
PROBLEM BE RESOLVED BY AFRICANS. THE OAU HAS A
MOMENTOUS, IF NOT DECISIVE, OPPORTUNITY TO ACT ON
BEHALF OF ALL BLACK AFRICANS, FOR AFRICAN NATIONALISM,
FOR AFRICAN SELF-DETERMINATION, FOR AFRICAN INTERESTS
GENERALLY. IF THE OAU, IN ITS JANUARY MEETING UNDER
THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF PRESIDENT AMIN, CAN DEVISE A CLEAR-
CUT AFRICAN PLAN FOR SETTLEMENT EVEN AS OUR ASSISTANCE
HELPS MAINTAIN THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND THE SOVIETS
AND OTHERS WILL NOT BE SO TEMPTED TO INTERVENE IN
TE FUTURE.

8. RIGHT NOW THE MAJOR TASK IS TO DISCOURAGE FURTHER
AFRICAN RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA. WE URGE YOU CONIINUE
TO USE THE INFLUENCE YOU POSSESS FOR THIS PURPOSE.
IF THE OAU CONVENES WITH NOT MORE THAN THE PRESENT
NUMBER OF RECOGNITIONS PRESIDENT AMIN WILL BE IN A
STRONG POSITION TO LEAD THE OAU ON A RESPONSIBLE
COURSE FOR THE BENEFIT OF AFRICA AND YOUR OWN COUNTRY.

9. TO THIS END WE HOPE THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED WILL
TAKE A LEAD ON THE FOLLOWING IDEAS: A CEASEFIRE, THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 001379

CESSATION OF ALL ARMS SHIPMENTS INTO ANGOLA AND ANY
FURTHER REINFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN TROOPS, TECHNICIANS
AND MERCENARIES; AN AOU MECHANISM TO CONDUCT IMMEDIATE
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MPLA, UNITA AND FNLA WITH A VIEW
TO BRINGING ABOUT A RECONCILIATION AMONG THE THREE
SIDES AND AGREEMENT ON A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; AND AN
END TO ALL OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. FURTHER RECOGNITIONS
AT THIS TIME WILL ONLY STRENGTHEN THE MPLA'S RESISTANCE
TO NEGOTIATION AND PLACE IN JEOPARDY A JUST AND
EQUITABLE SOLUTION.

10. IF THE OAU COULD TAKE THE LEAD ON SUCH A PROGRAM,
WE WOULD HELP TO PERSUADE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE
WORLD -- IN EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE -- TO
SUPPORT THIS PROGRAM. THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO

TALK TO THE SOVIETS ALONG THESE LINES AS WELL.

11. FINALLY, ONCE SUCH A GOVERNMENT IN ANGOLA WAS FORMED, THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO JOIN IN A MULTI-DONOR OPERATION FOR THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE ICRC. INGERSOLL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INSTRUCTIONS, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 JAN 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE001379
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: I
Film Number: P840096-1690
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760188/aaaadafs.tel
Line Count: 175
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09 APR 2004 by ElyME>; APPROVED <24 AUG 2004 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: TALKING POINTS: MESSAGE TO IDI AMIN
TAGS: PFOR, PEPR, AO, UG, US, (FORD, GERALD R), (AMIN DADA, IDI), (SCHAUFLE)
To: NAIROBI BONN
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006